The Federal Prosecution Service DESKBOOK
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Discussions between Crown and defence counsel which are intended to lead to a narrowing of the issues at trial, or which may avoid unnecessary litigation altogether, form an important and necessary part of the criminal justice system1. Discussions of this nature will be referred to throughout this chapter as “resolution discussions2
”. Though not defined in the Criminal Code, resolution discussions embrace several practices: which charges an accused may plead guilty to, how the case may proceed, what an appropriate sentence might be, what the facts of the offence are for the purposes of a guilty plea, and, if the case is to proceed to trial, how the issues might be narrowed so as to expedite the trial. Counsel are to make their best efforts to reach agreements on such issues as soon as possible. It must be emphasized, however, that any recommendations made to the court as part of a plea or sentence discussion are subject to the overriding discretion of the court to accept or reject any submission by counsel3.
Crown counsel's approach to resolution discussions must be based on several important principles: fairness, openness, accuracy, non-discrimination and the public interest in the effective and consistent enforcement of the criminal law.
Crown counsel may participate in resolution discussions where:
The Decision to Prosecute”;
Because of the importance of such discussions, Crown counsel should keep a record in respect of any offers made, or agreements reached.
Resolution discussion practices will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The following guidelines are not designed to require a set form. Instead, they are intended to give Crown counsel some guidance as to how to engage in meaningful discussions.
Charge discussions may properly include the following:
The following practices are not acceptable:
Procedural discussions may properly include the following:
Sentence discussions may properly include the following:
The following practice is not acceptable:
The following principles should inform Crown counsel’s approach to sentence negotiation:
Where an accused decides to plead guilty, Crown counsel should agree to put before the court those facts that could have been proved by admissible evidence if the matter went to trial. Discussions regarding the facts may properly include the following:
The following practices are not acceptable:
Pursuant to s. 625.1(2) of the Criminal Code, pre-trial conference are mandatory for cases in which a jury trial is to take place. Pre-trial conferences may also take place in trials to be conducted by a judge or justice alone, pursuant to s. 625.1(1). A system of judicially-supervised pre-trials now exists in many jurisdictions.
Judicially supervised pre-trial conferences are now an entrenched and important facet of our criminal justice system. They are effective not only for encouraging fair dispositions of cases without trial, but also for narrowing the issues in cases that do proceed to trial. Crown counsel are encouraged to take whatever steps are reasonably possible to ensure that such conferences run smoothly which may include:
For cases that are proceeding to trial, it is incumbent on Crown counsel to attempt to narrow the issues to be litigated as much as possible. Towards this end, Crown counsel should:
Plea or sentence negotiations with an unrepresented accused call for extreme care. In general, Crown counsel should not initiate negotiations with an unrepresented accused; if approached by an accused, however, counsel may negotiate in accordance with this policy. It is essential that any such discussions proceed only where it is clear that the accused is acting voluntarily17. Pursuant to s. 606 (1.1) of the Criminal Code, a court must be satisfied that pleas of guilty are made voluntarily and understood by accused persons.
Crown counsel should first encourage the accused to retain counsel and, where appropriate, advise the accused of the availability of legal aid. If the accused declines to retain counsel, Crown counsel should generally arrange for a third person to be present during discussions because of the need to maintain an arms-length relationship with the accused. A detailed record should be kept of all discussions. In most instances, a written agreement or written evidence of an agreement18 will be appropriate. When the case is disposed of in accordance with a negotiated plea or sentence agreement, Crown counsel should tell the judge about the existence of the agreement and that the accused was encouraged to retain counsel but declined to do so.
Crown counsel should not conduct plea or sentence discussions with an unrepresented accused unless satisfied that the accused has been given full disclosure or is aware of the right to full disclosure19.
Crown counsel should maintain a complete record of all plea and sentence discussions or agreements on the file. This will promote a consistent and informed practice.
The general principles of openness and fairness apply to all forms of discussions referred to above. Both principles are explained here.
Crown counsel should, where reasonably possible, solicit and weigh the views of those involved in the Crown's case -- in particular, the victim (where there is one) and the investigating agency. However, after consultation, the final responsibility for assessing the appropriateness of a plea agreement rests with Crown counsel20. If a plea agreement is reached, counsel should try to ensure that victims and investigating agencies understand the substance of the agreement and the reasoning behind it. The scope of this discussion may, in unusual circumstances, have to be limited by privacy or secrecy considerations in the accused's interest or in the general public interest.
Where a plea or sentence agreement has been reached, counsel should present the proposal to the trial judge in open court and on the record. In certain circumstances, it may be necessary to discuss some aspects of the agreement with the trial judge privately. This should be done only in rare and compelling situations involving facts which in the interest of the public or the accused ought not to be disclosed publicly. Common examples include cases where the accused is terminally ill, or has acted as a confidential informer for the police.21 It is not acceptable, however, to discuss a plea agreement privately with the trial judge in advance of the hearing to determine the court's reaction to it.22 This does not, however, prevent counsel's participation in a pre-trial conference conducted under section 625.1 of the Criminal Code. Counsel may conduct sentence proceedings before the judge who presides over the pre-trial conference.
All negotiated plea or sentence agreements should be honoured by the Crown unless fulfilling the agreement would clearly be contrary to the public interest. For example, Crown counsel must not proceed with an agreement if counsel has reason to believe that the criteria set out in Part V, Chapter 15, “The Decision to Prosecute
” have not been met. Additionally, Crown counsel may be justified in refusing to fulfil an agreement if misled about material facts. The decision not to fulfil an agreement should only be made after consultation with, and approval of, the Senior Regional Director.
As well, if counsel disagrees with an agreement earlier reached by a colleague23, the matter should be referred to the FPS Director or Senior Regional Director, if the matter cannot be resolved between colleagues.
If an accused enters a plea based on a negotiated plea or sentence agreement and the court disposes of the case on those terms, no appeal may be undertaken unless exceptional circumstances exist24 and the Senior Regional Director authorizes the appeal after consultation with the Assistant Deputy Attorney General (Criminal Law).
1 See, for example: R. v. S.K. (1995), 99 C.C.C.(3d) 376 at 382 (Ont.C.A.); Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Charge Screening, Disclosure, and Resolution Discussions (the “Martin Committeee Report
”), Ontario 1993, pp. 279-282; R. v. Closs (1998), 105 O.A.C. 392 (C.A.).
2 This subject matter is also dealt with in Part III, Chapter 8, “Management of Criminal Litigation
”.
3 R. v. Simoneau (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 307 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Pashe (1995), 91 W.A.C. 61 (Man.C.A.); R. v. Carder (1995), 102 W.A.C. 212 (Alta.C.A.); R. v. Winn (1998), 38 O.R.(3d) 159 (Ont.C.A.), upholding 25 O.R.(3d) 750 (Ont.Ct.(Gen.Div.)).
4 This includes an offence arising out of the same transaction: Criminal Code, s. 606(4).
5 This practice is now regulated by s. 725 of the Criminal Code. For decisions which governed the practice prior to the enactment of s. 725, see R. v. Garcia and Silva, [1970] 3 C.C.C. 124 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Ness (1987), 77 A.R. 319 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Getty (1990), 104 A.R. 180 (Alta. C.A.).
6 As occurred in R. v. Robinson (1979), 49 C.C.C.(2d) 464 (Ont.C.A.), where the prosecution accepted a plea to robbery and relied on additional facts pertaining to a charge of rape that was withdrawn.
7 See Part V, Chapter 21, “Waiver of Charges
” for the policy and procedure on waivers.
8 But see the specific policy on sentencing in certain types of offence: Part VI, Chapter 28, “Spousal Violence
” and Part VI, Chapter 31, “Firearms and Other Offensive Weapons
”.
9 See for example, subsection 109(1) of the Criminal Code which requires a prohibition order for firearms in certain cases.
10 But see Part VI, Chapter 27, “Impaired Driving Cases: Notice to Seek Greater Punishment
” and Part VI, Chapter 31, “Firearms and Other Offensive Weapons
”, which set out the policy on seeking greater punishment.
11 This section follows up on suggestions made by the Report of the Criminal Justice Review Committee (Ontario: Queen’s Printer, 1999) p. 59.
12 In Competition Act matters, because of the frequent involvement of counsel during the investigative stage, discussions may take place before changes are laid.
13 This point is discussed further in Part IV, Chapter 13, “Management of Criminal Litigation
”.
14 See, however, section 20.3.8.2 on the treatment of agreements entered into which are not in the public interest.
15 This section follows up on suggestions made by the Report of the Criminal Justice Review Committee (Ontario: Queen’s Printer, 1999) pp. 66-68.
16 It may be useful in this regard to draw up a list of potential admissions and provide it to defence counsel for his or her signature.
17 See, in this regard, R. v. Rajaeefard (1996), 104 C.C.C.(3d) 225 (Ont.C.A.), where undue pressure was brought to bear on the accused by a judge.
18 Such as a memorandum to file or, minimally, a detailed endorsement on the file.
19 See Part V, Chapter 18, “Disclosure
”, on providing disclosure to an unrepresented accused.
20 See Part I, Chapter 4, “The Independence of the Attorney General
”.
21 Even then, it is preferable to have a court reporter present in chambers so that a complete and accurate record of the discussions can later be made available if necessary.
22 Pre-plea participation by the trial judge in charge of sentence negotiations has been universally condemned by the courts, and others: R. v. Wood (1975), 26 C.C.C. (2d) 100 at 108 (Alta. S.C.); R. v. Dubien (1982), 67 C.C.C. (2d) 341 at 346 - 7 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. White (1982), 39 Nfld. and P.E.I.R. 196 (Nfld. C.A.). Generally, see: G.A. Ferguson, “The Role of the Judge in Plea Bargaining
”, (1972-3), 15 Crim. L. Q. 26; Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 60, Plea Discussions and Agreements, at 12-15, and Recommendation 4; Curran, “Discussions in the Judges Private Room
”, [1991] Crim. L. R. 79.
23 In Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257 (U.S.S.C.) the court held that prosecutors must advise each other of commitments or agreements made with respect to sentencing. The fact that another prosecutor was not a party to the agreement is no excuse for defaulting on the agreement. See as well Part IV, Chapter 13, “Management of Criminal Litigation
”, regarding the circumstances in which it may be possible to depart from a previous agreement.
24 See R. v. Wood, supra, note 22 where the court held that the Attorney General is not barred from appealing a sentence based on a position taken at trial by a Crown counsel. And see R. v. Simoneau (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 307 (Man. C.A.) where the court held that the appellate court will not necessarily hold the Crown to the position it agreed to take at trial but would determine whether the Crown should be bound by that position depending on the circumstances of each case; and Attorney General of Canada v. Roy (1972), 18 C.R.N.S. 89 (Que. Q.B.): The Crown, on appeal should not repudiate its position taken at trial except in specific circumstances. The circumstances are as follows:
But see R. v. Agozzino, [1970] 1 C.C.C. 380 (Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Goodwin (1981), 43 N.S.R. (2d) 106 (N.S.C.A.) where the courts held that the Crown could not, on appeal, repudiate the position it agreed to take at trial.
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