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The Federal Prosecution Service DESKBOOK

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Part III
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING CROWN COUNSEL'S CONDUCT
Chapter 9


9 THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CROWN COUNSEL

9.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the duties and responsibilities of Crown counsel in the provision of legal advice and the conduct of criminal litigation. The term “Crown counsel”, as used in this chapter and throughout the Deskbook, is meant to refer to lawyers employed by the Department of Justice and private sector agents acting on behalf of the Attorney General of Canada1.

9.2 Provision of Legal Advice

Crown counsel often are asked to provide legal advice to departments and agencies within the federal government and to law enforcement agencies involved in enforcing federal law.

9.2.1 Conflicting Policies and Conflict of Interest

Crown counsel are not employed by the departments and agencies to which they provide legal advice. At all times, counsel remain representatives of the Attorney General of Canada2. Counsel should be aware that policies of the Attorney General may conflict with those of the departments and agencies. Conflicts could, for example, arise between a department's enforcement policy and the Attorney General's prosecution policy. Crown counsel shall at all times comply with the policies of the Attorney General. If policies conflict, counsel shall advise the department or agency of the conflict and resolve the matter under the usual consultation process established for resolving conflicts.3

Counsel should also be careful to avoid a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest4. An easily identifiable conflict of interest may arise where, for example, counsel prosecutes a former client5. However, conflicts of interest may also arise due to the structure or organization of government. For example, a conflict may arise where there is a recommendation for prosecution by one government department against another government department, both of whom, from time to time, are represented by the Department of Justice. If this occurs, Crown counsel should advise the Regional Director or Senior Regional Director who will consider whether it would be more appropriate to retain counsel from the private sector, as agent of the Attorney General of Canada, to review the evidence, provide advice on the charges, and conduct any resulting prosecution.6

9.2.2 Management or Policy Decisions

Crown counsel are not responsible for making management or policy decisions for government departments and agencies. Counsel's duty is to give legal advice on criminal law matters. This may include advising investigative agencies about the criminal law issues arising from an investigation, practice, or policy. Counsel have a further responsibility to discuss the public interest implications with a department or agency contemplating a prosecution and to apply the Attorney General's policy regarding those interests.7

When advising investigative agencies, Crown counsel must always recognize the distinction between the role of the police and the role of the prosecutor in the administration of justice8. Given the increasing complexity of law enforcement, counsel may be asked to become involved at the investigative stage. For example, in wiretap and search warrant cases, counsel may be asked to advise and assist the agency that is preparing preliminary documents. Effective management of complex litigation requires pre-charge co-operation between the police and Crown counsel. However, the existence of such a relationship does not diminish the desirability of an independent, impartial assessment of both the evidence and public interest considerations when the decision is made as to whether to prosecute9.

9.2.3 Solicitor-Client Privilege

Legal advice given by Crown counsel to government departments and investigative agencies is protected by solicitor-client privilege10. Crown counsel may not release the legal opinion, refer to it, or describe it in any fashion to defence counsel11 or the public unless the privilege has been waived. Crown counsel must be conscious of the fact that not everything they do will be covered by privilege – whether or not the privilege attaches depends on the nature of the relationship, the subject matter of the advice and the circumstances in which it is sought12.

With law enforcement agencies outside the Government of Canada, the privilege rests with the agency. With departments and agencies within the Government of Canada, the privilege rests with the Crown in right of Canada. In practical terms, however, decisions concerning privilege, such as waiver, are usually made by the government department or agency that received the advice. In some instances, particularly those in which there is a strong public interest,13 decisions of this nature should be made in consultation with the Privy Council Office and the Department of Justice.

Written legal opinions given by Crown counsel should, in general, be marked “Protected: Solicitor/Client Privilege”.

9.3 The Conduct of Criminal Litigation

The responsibilities placed on Crown counsel as law officers of the Crown flow from the special obligations resting on the office of the Attorney General of Canada. As a result, Crown counsel are subject to certain ethical obligations which may differ from those of defence counsel.14

The Attorney General and his or her agents are vested with very substantial discretionary powers15. Public interest considerations require Crown counsel to exercise judgment and discretion which go beyond functioning simply as advocates.16 Counsel appearing for the Attorney General are considered “ministers of justice”, more part of the court than proponents of a cause.17 Fairness, moderation, and dignity should characterize the conduct of Crown counsel during criminal litigation.18 This does not mean that counsel cannot conduct vigorous and thorough prosecutions19. Indeed, vigour and thoroughness are important qualities in Crown counsel. Criminal litigation on the part of the Crown, however, should not become a personal contest of skill or professional pre-eminence.20

The conduct of criminal litigation is not restricted to the trial in open court. It also encompasses the prosecutorial authority of Crown counsel leading up to trial -- for example, the decision to prosecute, referring an alleged offender to an alternative measures program,21 disclosure, the right to stay proceedings or withdraw charges, elect the mode of trial, grant immunity to a witness, prefer indictments, join charges and accused, consent to re-elections, and consent to the waiver of charges between jurisdictions. Crown counsel’s obligation to ensure the integrity of the prosecution continues throughout the litigation process.22

Both in and out of court, Crown counsel exercise broad discretionary powers. Courts generally do not interfere with this discretion unless it has been exercised for an oblique motive, offends the right to a fair trial or amounts to an abuse of process. Accordingly, counsel must exercise this discretion fairly, impartially, in good faith and according to the highest ethical standards. This is particularly so where decisions are made outside the public forum, as they may have far greater practical effect on the administration of justice than the public conduct of counsel in court.23

In the conduct of criminal prosecutions, Crown counsel have many responsibilities. The following are among the most important.

9.3.1 The duty to ensure that the responsibilities of the office of the Attorney General are carried out with integrity and dignity

Counsel can fulfil this duty:

  • by complying with applicable rules of ethics established by their bar association;
  • by exercising careful judgment in presenting the case for the Crown, deciding what witnesses to call, and what evidence to tender;
  • by acting with moderation, fairness, and impartiality;
  • by not discriminating on any basis prohibited by s. 15 of the Charter;
  • by adequately preparing for each case;
  • by not becoming simply an extension of a client department or investigative agency;24 and
  • by conducting plea and sentence negotiations in a manner consistent with the policy set out in this deskbook.25

9.3.2 The duty to preserve judicial independence

Counsel can fulfil this duty:

  • by not discussing matters relating to a case with the presiding judge without the participation of defence counsel;
  • by not dealing with matters in chambers that should properly be dealt with in open court;
  • by avoiding personal or private discussions with a judge in chambers while presenting a case before that judge; and
  • by refraining from appearing before a judge on a contentious matter when a personal friendship exists between Crown counsel and the judge.

9.3.3 The duty to be fair and to appear to be fair

Counsel can fulfil this duty:

  • by making disclosure in accordance with the policy set out in this manual;26
  • by bringing all relevant cases and authorities known to counsel to the attention of the court, even if they may be contrary to the Crown's position;
  • by not expressing personal opinions on the evidence, including the credibility of witnesses, in court or in public;
  • by being conscious of the factors that can lead to wrongful convictions, such as false confessions and mistaken eyewitness identification;
  • by zealously guarding against the possibility of being afflicted by “tunnel vision27, through close identification with the investigative agency and/or victim, or through pressure by the media and/or special interest groups;
  • by remaining open to alternative theories put forward by the defence;
  • by not expressing personal opinions on the guilt or innocence of the accused in court or in public;
  • by asking relevant and proper questions during the examination of a witness and by not asking questions designed solely to embarrass, insult, abuse, belittle, or demean the witness. Cross examination can be skilful and probing, yet still show respect for the witness;
  • by respecting the court, defence counsel, the accused, and the proceedings while vigorously asserting the Crown's position; and
  • by never permitting personal interests or partisan political considerations to interfere with the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

9.3.3.1 Inflammatory Remarks and Conduct

As part of the Crown’s duty to be fair, counsel are obliged to ensure that any comments made during jury addresses are not “inflammatory”. Whether an address will be held to be inflammatory is determined by looking at the number and nature of the comments, and the tone of the address. Ultimately, the test is whether the objectionable comments are seen to have deprived the accused of his or her right to a fair trial.

As mentioned previously, the Attorney General and his or her agents have very substantial discretionary powers. It must be borne in mind that the opportunity to damage the reputation of the administration of justice is always present28.

The general principles governing Crown jury addresses have been referred to by Fish J.A. of the Québec Court of Appeal in R. v. Charest (1990), 76 C.R.(3d) 63:

The principles which emerge from Boucher, Vallières and other leading cases ... may be summarized as follows. Crown counsel’s duty is not to obtain a conviction, but “to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime” ... The Crown should press fully and firmly every legitimate argument tending to establish guilt, but must be “accurate, fair and dispassionate in conducting the prosecution and in addressing the jury” ... It is improper for Crown counsel to express his or her opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused ... or as to the credibility of any witness. Such expressions of opinion are objectionable not only because of their partisan nature, but also because they amount to testimony which likely would be inadmissible even if Crown counsel had been sworn as a witness ... Crown counsel should not advert to any unproven facts, even if they are material and could have been admitted as evidence. Applicable principles of law should be left for the judge to explain; when reference to the law is necessary for the purpose of making an argument, the law should be accurately stated.

The principles are well known. Their application, of course, is a function of the nature and number of comments made in each case, of the specific language used and of the overall tone of counsel’s address. The likely effect of any corrective action taken by the trial judge must also be considered. Ultimately, the conclusive test is whether the objectionable comments are seen to have deprived the accused of his right to a fair hearing on the evidence presented at trial. [citations omitted throughout]

The kinds of comments and conduct that have been found to be “inflammatory” (and thus render the trial unfair) can be divided into six categories:

  • Expressions of personal opinion
    • these include opinions: on issues in the case; on the honesty and integrity of police witnesses; that he or she does not believe the accused; or that the accused is guilty.29
  • Negative comments about the accused’s or a witness’s credibility or character
    • Such comments may include excessive reference to the accused’s criminal record, native country, likelihood of being a liar, excessive use of sarcasm or exaggeration in referring to the accused or defence witnesses.30
  • Observations or statements of fact not supported by the evidence
    • These situations tend to be ones in which Crown counsel misstates the evidence in a way which impugns the accused’s character.31
  • Appeals to fear, emotion or prejudice
    • These comments are often in terrorem arguments in which Crown counsel urges the jury to protect society from the accused, who is portrayed in very unflattering terms.32
  • Negative comments about the accused’s counsel
    • On occasion, Crown counsel have suggested that defence counsel have used improper tactics, presented illegal evidence or made other comments designed to portray defence counsel as being untrustworthy.33
  • Inappropriate language, tactics, and conduct in general
    • Characterizations of the accused as a liar, excessive use of sarcasm, ridicule or derision, use of biblical references and irrelevant authority, are proscribed.34 Inappropriate tactics include:
    • not placing before the court all the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of statements from the accused;
    • eliciting through a friendly witness a remark that is unsupported by any evidence and continuing to press the point in the presence of the jury during a discussion with the judge;
    • in cross-examination of the accused, while professing to test his credibility, bringing various matters before the jury which have no direct relation to the question of the accused’s guilt;
    • at the conclusion of the evidence given by the accused in his defence, stating in the presence of the jury that the accused will be arrested for perjury;
    • improperly presenting evidence to the jury through the device of reading from reports of judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada;
    • during a hearing to review parole ineligibility pursuant to s. 745 of the Criminal Code, discrediting the procedure of reviewing parole ineligibility as well as the parole process; and
    • raising a “concoction theory” with respect to disclosure for the first time in the closing address35.

9.4 Prevention of Wrongful Convictions

In January 2005, FPT Ministers Responsible for Justice released the Report of the Working Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice. The Report calls a wrongful conviction “a failure of justice in the most fundamental sense.

No matter how many cases are successfully prosecuted every day in our courtrooms, wrongful convictions, regardless of how infrequent, are a reminder of the fallibility of the justice system and a stain on its well-deserved positive reputation.

Public confidence in the administration of justice is fostered by demonstrating that participants in the criminal justice system are willing to take action to prevent future miscarriages of justice. It is also important to foster public understanding that fair, independent and impartial police investigations and Crown prosecutions are in the public interest 36.

The Report makes a series of recommendations on what prosecutors can do to prevent wrongful convictions and concludes “everyone involved in the criminal justice system must be constantly on guard against the factors that can contribute to miscarriages of justice.” Indeed, the Working Group believes that individual police officers and prosecutors, individual police forces and prosecution services, and indeed the entire police and prosecution communities, must make the prevention of wrongful convictions a constant priority.

In particular, the Report notes that “tunnel vision” has been identified as a leading cause of wrongful convictions in Canada and elsewhere and is the “antithesis” of the proper role of Crown counsel. “Tunnel vision must be guarded against vigilantly, as it is a trap that can capture even the best police officer or prosecutor.37

Many of the Report's recommendations are reflected throughout this Deskbook. Although the Report's recommendations are aimed primarily at the most serious of offences, particularly homicides, many of its suggestions have general application.

9.5 Additional References

Re: Skogman and The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 93; 13 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.): Crown counsel are in a different position from the ordinary litigant, for they represent the public interest in the community at large.

Boucher v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16; 110 C.C.C. 263 (S.C.C.): “It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is presented: it should be done so firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength, but it must also be done fairly. The role of the prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged with a greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings.

R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C): The Crown is under a duty at common law to disclose to the defence all material evidence, whether favourable to the accused or not. Transgressions with respect to this duty constitute a very serious breach of legal ethics.

Lemay v. The King, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 232; 102 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.): There is a long established rule that the prosecutor has discretion to determine who are material witnesses, and this discretion will not be interfered with unless it was exercised for an oblique motive.

Cunliffe and Bledsoe v. Law Society of British Columbia (1984), 13 C.C.C. (3d) 560 (B.C.C.A.): It is extremely important to the proper administration of justice that Crown counsel be aware of and fulfil their duty to be fair.

R. v. Lalonde (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 168 (Ont. H.C.): The Crown Attorney must be firm while being fair in prosecuting the accused so that the Court will not be duped by defences which are not thoroughly examined in Court. The criminal law leaves to the Crown Attorney many discretions as to whom and what to prosecute, and the conduct of the Crown's case. Our law does not equate a good and fair Crown Attorney with a weak lawyer.

R. v. Sugarman (1935), 25 Cr. App. R. 109: It cannot be too often made plain that the business of counsel for the Crown is fairly and impartially to exhibit all the facts to the jury. The Crown has no interest in procuring a conviction. Its only interest is that the right person should be convicted, that the truth should be known, and that justice should be done.

R. v. Power (1994), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.): The Attorney General reflects through his or her prosecutorial function, the interest of the community to see that justice is properly done. The Attorney General's role in this regard is not only to protect the public, but also to honour and express the community's sense of justice. Accordingly, courts should be careful before they attempt to “second-guess” the prosecutor's motives when he or she makes a decision. Where there is conspicuous evidence of improper motives or of bad faith or of an act so wrong that it violates the conscience of the community, such that it would genuinely be unfair and indecent to proceed, then and only then should courts intervene to prevent an abuse of process which could bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Cases of this nature will be extremely rare.

CBA Code of Professional Conduct, Chap. VIII, page 29 commentary 7: When engaged as a prosecutor the lawyer's prime duty is not to seek to convict, but to see that justice is done through a fair trial on the merits. The prosecutor exercises a public function involving much discretion and power and must act fairly and dispassionately. He should not do anything which might prevent the accused from being represented by counsel or communicating with counsel and to the extent required by law and accepted practice, he should make timely disclosure to the accused or his counsel (or to the court if the accused is unrepresented) of all relevant facts and witnesses known to him, whether tending towards guilt or innocence.


1 See also Part II, Chapter 7, “The Role of Agents in the Delivery of Prosecution Services”.

2 See Part I, Chapter 4, “The Independence of the Attorney General”.

3 See Chapter IX, Part 45, “Consultation with Responsibility Centres” and Part III, Chapter 4, “The Relationship between Crown Counsel and the Police”.

4 4 Also of relevance in considering the issue of accepting a benefit are subsection 121(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (dealing with accepting benefits from persons having dealings with the government), section 122 of the Code (dealing with breach of trust by a public officer) and The Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for the Public Service. With respect to outside employment, see Part X, Chapter 50, “Conflict of Interest: Outside Employment”.

5 See also Part II, Chapter 7, “The Role of Agents in the Delivery of Prosecution Services” for more detailed examples of conflicts of interest.

6 See Part VI, Chapter 32, “R. v. R.: Prosecutions Against the Crown”.

7 See Part V, Chapter 15, “The Decision to Prosecute”, for a list of public interest considerations and how they relate to the decision to prosecute.

8 See Part III, Chapter 11, “The Relationship between Crown Counsel and the Police”.

9 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stressed the importance of Crown Counsel’s duty to maintain objectivity: see R. v Regan, 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227.

10 See: R. v. Shirose, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565 at 601; R. v. Ovidio Jesus Herrera, (21 November 1990) (Ont. Ct. G.D.) [unreported]; Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, (No. 2), [1972] 2 All E.R. 353 at 373-85 (C.A.); Waterford v. Commonwealth of Australia (1987), 71 A.L.R. 673 (H.C.); Idziak v. Minister of Justice, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631; Canada (Attorney General) v. Sander (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 41 (B.C.C.A.). There may be situations where the privilege must yield: see R. v. Gray (1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 332 (B.C.C.A.); or is effectively waived, as in R. v. Shirose at 611-615. In the R. v. Trang series of decisions, 2002 ABQB 390, and again in 2002 ABQB 744, Binder J. held that the standard of proof required to establish Crown solicitor-client privilege is the balance of probabilities, i.e. it is no different than for a private lawyer and client.

11 See R. v. Stinchcombe (1991), 68 C.C.C.(3d) 1 at 9-10 (S.C.C.). For guidance on this issue when involved in a criminal prosecution, also see Part V, Chapter 18, “Disclosure”.

12 R. v. Shirose, note 9, at 602.

13 13 For some examples of these types of cases, see Part IX, Chapter 45, “Consultation with Responsibility Centres”, section 45.4.9, “Cases of Significant Public Interest”.

14 See also: Marc Rosenberg, The Ethical Prosecutor, a paper presented at the 1991 Federal Prosecutors' Conference, and Re Skogman and The Queen (1984), 13 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.), which holds that Crown counsel are in a different position from the ordinary litigant, for they represent the public interest in the community at large.

15 See The Ethical Prosecutor, note 14.

16 Re Skogman and The Queen, note 14.

17 Boucher v The Queen (1954), 110 C.C.C. 263 at 270 (S.C.C.): “It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength, but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings.” See also the the discussion of role of Crown counsel by former Supreme Court Justice Peter de C. Cory, in The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow (2001), at p.39.

18 Ibid.

19 The Supreme Court has said that vigorous Crown advocacy is “a critical element of this country’s criminal law mechanism”: R. v. Cook , [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1113 at para.21; 114 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at 489 (S.C.C.).

20 Boucher v The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16 at 23-24; 110 C.C.C. 263 at 270 (S.C.C.): “It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown endeavouring to convict and the accused endeavouring to be acquitted; but it is an investigation that should be conducted without feeling or animus on the part of the prosecution, with the single view of determining the truth.R. v. Savion and Mizrahi (1980), 52 C.C.C. (2d) 276 at 289 (Ont. C.A.): “By reason of the nature of the adversary system of trial, a Crown prosecutor is an advocate; he is entitled to discharge his duties with industry, skill, and vigour. Indeed, the public is entitled to expect excellence in a Crown prosecutor... But a Crown prosecutor is more than an advocate, he is a public officer engaged in the administration of justice...

21 See Part IV, Chapter 14, “Alternative Measures (Diversion)”.

22 See, for example, R. v. Ahluwahlia (2000), 149 C.C.C.(3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.), where Crown counsel was criticized for having failed to investigate an allegation that a Crown witness had committed perjury at the trial.

23 See The Ethical Prosecutor, note 14. See also: Cunliffe and Bledsoe v. Law Society of British Columbia (1984), 13 C.C.C. (3d) 560 (B.C.C.A.): It is extremely important to the proper administration of justice that Crown counsel be aware of and fulfill their duty to be fair.

24 See Part I, Chapter 4, “The Independence of the Attorney General”.

25 See Part V, Chapter 20, “Plea and Sentence Discussions and Issue Resolution”.

26 See Part V, Chapter 18, “Disclosure”.

27Tunnel vision” has been defined as “the single minded and overly narrow focus on an investigation or prosecutorial theory so as to unreasonably colour the evaluation of information received and one's conduct in response to the information.” Ontario. Commission of Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin. Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1998, Vol.1, p.601. (The “Kaufman Report.”) ( http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/).

28 See The Ethical Prosecutor, note 14.

29 See, for example: R. v. Michaud, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 3; R. v. McDonald (1958), 120 C.C.C. 209 (Ont.C.A.); R. v. Murphy (1981), 43 N.S.R. (2d) 676 (C.A.); Moubarak v. R.; Elzein v. R., [1982] Que.C.A. 454; R. v. B. (R.B.) (2001), 152 C.C.C. (3d) 437 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Swietlinski, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 481.

30 See, for example: Pisani v. The Queen, [1971] S.C.R. 738; Tremblay v. The Queen (1963), 40 C.R. 303 (Que.C.A.); R. v. Romeo, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 86; R. v. Charest (1990), 76 C.R.(3d) 63 (Que.C.A.); R. v. C. (R.) (1999), 137 C.C.C. (3d) 87 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Davis (1995) 108 W.A.C. 81 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Sheri (2004), 185 C.C.C.(3d) 155 (Ont.C.A.).

31 See, for example: Grabowski v. The Queen, [1971] S.C.R. 738; Emkeit v. The Queen, [1974] S.C.R. 133; R. v. Huback (1966), 48 C.R. 252 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Sutherland (1996), 112 C.C.C.(3d) 454 (Sask.C.A.); R. v. Peavoy (1997), 34 O.R.(3d) 620 (C.A.); R. v. Khan (1998), 126 C.C.C.(3d) 353 (Man. C.A.).

32 See, for example: R. v. Labarre (1978), 45 C.C.C.(2d) 171 (Que.C.A.); R. v. Gratton (1985), 18 C.C.C.(3d) 462 (Ont.C.A.); Moubarak, note 28; R. v. Munroe (1995), 96 C.C.C.(3d) 431 (Ont. C.A.) aff’d 102 C.C.C.(3d) 383 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pitt (1996), 109 C.C.C. (3d) 488 (N.B.C.A.), leave to S.C.C. dismissed 112 C.C.C.(3d) vii.

33 See Moubarak, note 26. R. v. Shchavinsky (2000), 148 C.C.C. (3d0 400 (Ont.C.A.); R. v. D.(C.) (2000), 145 C.C.C.(3d) 290 (Ont.C.A.); R. v Siu (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 301 (B.C.C.A.).

34 See R. v. Gilling (1997), 117 C.C.C.(3d) 444 (Ont.C.A.); Provencher v. The Queen (1955), 114 C.C.C. 100 (S.C.C.); Richard v. The Queen (1957), 126 C.C.C. 255 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. R.R.I. (1997), 112 C.C.C.(3d) 367 (S.C.C.); [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1124; R. v. Swietlinski, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 481; R. v. Khan (1998), 126 C.C.C. (3d) 523 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Ballony-Reeder (2001), 153 C.C.C.(3d) 511 (B.C.C.A.)

35 See R. v. Gilling (1997), 117 C.C.C.(3d) 444 (Ont.C.A.); Provencher v. The Queen (1995), 114 C.C.C. 100 (S.C.C.); Richard v. The Queen (1960), 126 C.C.C. 255 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. R.R.I. (1997), 112 C.C.C.(3d) 367 (B.C.C.A.).

36 FPT Heads of Prosecution Committee, Report of the Working Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice, 2005, p.2. (http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/pmj-pej/index.html).

37 FPT Heads of Prosecution Committee, Report of the Working Group on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice, 2005, p.36. (http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/pmj-pej/index.html).

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Date Modified:
2008-12-24